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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals from district court’s order granting Larry Penkunis’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of containers in a car. The district court
granted the motion because the police officer’s warrantless search could not be justified under
the automobile exception since the car was not readily mobile. Under the facts of this case, the
district court was correct. Mr. Penkunis respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court’s order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 24, 2016, around 11:00 p.m., Officer Mongan drove by a woman sitting in
a parked car. (R., p.231.) Officer Mongan saw her “acting nervous” and “making what [he]
believed to be a furtive movement” as he drove by. (R., p.231.) Based on her “suspicious”
behavior, Officer Mongan decided to contact the woman, so he went through an alley and pulled
up behind her car. (R., p.232; Tr., p.44, Ls.1–7.) As he questioned the woman (identified as
Michaela Morton), he noticed that she moved frantically, had trouble tracking the conversation,
and had dilated pupils. (R., p.232.) During their conversation, Ms. Morton told Officer Mongan
that her friend Larry/Lonnie1 was inside the residence nearest to her parked car. She was unsure
whether she or Larry/Lonnie had driven to their current location. (R., p.232.) Ms. Morton told
Officer Mongan that she was waiting for him. (R., p.232.) She also told Officer Mongan that
Larry/Lonnie had taken the keys to the car. (R., p.232.)

1

There was some confusion over Mr. Penkunis’s name during Officer Mongan’s investigation.
(R., p.233; see also Tr., p.26, Ls.6–20.)
1

Ms. Morton consented to a search of her person and the car. (R. p.232.) In the passenger
compartment, Officer Mongan found a small pill container with a white crystalline substance
inside that he believed to be methamphetamine. (R., p.232.) Officer Mongan never tested the
substance, however. (Tr., p.49, Ls.12–14.) Ms. Morton admitted that the item was hers.
(R., p.232.) During this encounter, Officer Mongan testified that he was not detaining
Ms. Morton for possession of paraphernalia or investigating any other crime. (Tr., p.51, Ls.19–
21.) Officer Mongan just thought “[i]t was a suspicious circumstance.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.13–14.)
Officer Mongan then searched the trunk and found three backpacks. (R., p.232.) He
opened one of the backpacks (a “Molle” style backpack) and found a pill bottle inside with the
name “Larry Penkunis.” (R., pp.232–33, Tr., p.33, Ls.4–14.) He also found a lockbox and a safe
in the “Molle” backpack. (R., pp.232–33.)
Officer Mongan seized the backpacks. (R., p.233.) Officer Mongan testified that “he
seized the [back]packs and locked boxes because he believed [Mr. Penkunis] was suspiciously
avoiding police contact that night, and because of the presence of suspected drug paraphernalia
he found on the front seat.” (R., p.233.) He also testified that, at some point, he requested a drug
dog, which alerted on the car. (R., p.233; Tr., p.34, Ls.11–13.) The keys were never located in
the car. (Tr., p.31, Ls.20–21, p.32, Ls.16–21.) Officer Mongan stored the backpacks at the police
station. (R., p.234.)
Two days later, another police officer, Detective Hildebrandt, began investigating the
death of Ms. Morton. (R., p.234.) Detective Hildebrandt obtained a search warrant for the safe
and lockbox inside the “Molle” backpack. (R., p.234.) He found drugs and paraphernalia inside.
(R., p.234.)
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Based on the contraband found in the “Molle” backpack, the State charged Mr. Penkunis
with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, along with the sentencing
enhancement for a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.47–48.) Mr. Penkunis moved to suppress
the evidence from the warrantless search of the car. (R., pp.56–58, 60–68.) The State responded.
(Aug. R., pp.1–8.)
The district court held a hearing, and Mr. Penkunis, Officer Mongan, and Detective
Hildebrandt, and Mr. Penkunis’s parole officer testified. (See generally Tr., p.4, L.5–p.93, L.23.)
The district court also admitted Officer Mongan’s body cam video and an audio recording of
Mr. Penkunis’s interview with Detective Hildebrandt. (State’s Exs. 3, 5.) After the hearing, the
district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.93. Ls.20–23.) The State and
Mr. Penkunis submitted supplemental briefing. (R., pp.175–83, 186–91.)
The district court granted the motion. (R., pp.231–41.) First, the district court reasoned
that Mr. Penkunis did not abandon the backpacks. (R., pp.236–37.) Second, the district court
determined that Ms. Morton lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to the search or
seizure of Mr. Penkunis’s backpacks. (R., pp.237–38.) Third, the district court turned to the
automobile exception as the remaining justification for the backpacks’ warrantless search and
seizure. (R., pp.238–41.) The district court concluded that the State did not meet its burden to
justify the warrantless search under the automobile exception because the car was not readily
mobile. (R., pp.238–29.) Finally, the district court ruled that the subsequent search of the
lockbox and safe was unreasonably delayed and a direct fruit of Officer Mongan’s unlawful
seizure. (R., pp.240–41.) Accordingly, the district court granted Mr. Penkunis’s motion to
suppress. (R., p.241.)

3

The State appealed from the district court’s order granting the motion. (R., pp.244–46.)
The district court stayed any action in the case pending the outcome on appeal. (R., p.263.)

4

ISSUE
The State frames the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by concluding the automobile exception did not apply
because the occupant of the car claimed to not have the keys to the car?
Mr. Penkunis rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly grant Mr. Penkunis’s motion to suppress because
the State failed to show that the automobile exception justified the warrantless
search of his backpacks in the car?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Granted Mr. Penkunis’s Motion To Suppress Because The State
Failed To Show That The Automobile Exception Justified The Warrantless Search Of His
Backpacks In The Car
A.

Introduction
Mr. Penkunis submits that the district court properly granted his motion to suppress.

After the State failed to show Mr. Penkunis abandoned his backpacks and failed to show
Ms. Morton had the authority to consent to the search of his backpacks, the only exception left to
justify the warrantless search of the backpacks was the automobile exception. The State did not
meet its burden to establish this exception either. Under the facts of this case, the district court
appropriately ruled that the automobile exception was inapplicable because the car was not
readily mobile. As such, Mr. Penkunis respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court’s order granting his motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free
review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney,
153 Idaho at 408.
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C.

The District Court Properly Ruled That The Automobile Exception Did Not Justify The
Warrantless Search Of The Backpacks Since The Car Was Not Readily Mobile
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on
probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003)
(citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend IV. “When a warrantless search or seizure is
challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement is applicable.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002)); State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same).
One exception to a warrantless search is the “automobile exception.” This exception was
first set forth by the United States Supreme Court over ninety years ago in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). “There, the Court recognized that the privacy interests in an
automobile are constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of the
automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests.” California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 390 (1985). “The capacity to be ‘quickly moved’ was clearly the basis of the holding
in Carroll, and [subsequent] cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the
principal bases of the automobile exception.” Id. at 390–91 (citing Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 442 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588 (1974); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)).
“Ready mobility,” however, “is not the only basis for the exception.” Id. at 391. The
automobile exception “has historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the
presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for
transportation.” Id. at 394 (emphasis added). “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous
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warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile
is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.” Id. (quoting South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)); see also, e.g., State v. Lovely, 159 Idaho 675, 677
(Ct. App. 2016) (noting both bases for the automobile exception); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho
277, 281–82 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). “These reduced expectations of privacy derive . . . from the
pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Carney, 471 U.S.
at 392. “In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced
expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without
prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable
cause is met.” Id.
In most cases, the “readily mobile” aspect of the automobile exception is not in dispute.
There is no question of the car’s mobility because, usually, a traffic stop preceded the
warrantless search of the car. As such, Idaho appellate courts only recently adopted a “readily
mobile” test. In State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2014), police officers searched a sedan
parked in the private driveway of an apartment while executing a search warrant for the
apartment and a different vehicle. 2 Id. at 805, 808. No officer had seen the sedan move. Id. at
808. The defendant argued that the sedan was not readily mobile and thus excluded from the
automobile exception. Id. at 805–06, 807–09. Directly addressing “readily mobile” for the first
time, the Court of Appeals held: “[T]he test for whether a vehicle parked in a residential area is
mobile for purposes of the automobile exception is whether, viewed objectively, there was any
indication that the vehicle was not mobile. Absent some objective indicia of immobility, an

2

While executing the search warrant, the officers ran a drug dog around the sedan, and the dog
alerted. Gosch, 157 Idaho at 805.
8

automobile is presumed to be mobile.” Id. at 808–09. The Court of Appeals relied on decisions
from the Eighth and Ninth Circuit to craft its “readily mobile” test:
In [United States v. Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836 (8th Cir. 1987)], the court
held that a warrantless search of a vehicle parked in a residential area was within
the automobile exception because “the vehicle’s alleged immobility was not
visibly apparent.” Hepperle, 810 F.2d at 840. Similarly, in [United States v.
Hatley, 15 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1994)], the Ninth Circuit held that, even though a
vehicle parked in a residential area “was not actually mobile, it was apparently
mobile.” Hatley, 15 F.3d at 859. There was nothing apparent to the officers to
suggest the car was immobile. It was not up on blocks, and there is no information
in the record to indicate the tires were flat or that the wheels of the car were
missing. The Hatley court further explained that it “would be unduly burdensome
to require the police to establish that every car that appeared to be mobile was
indeed mobile.” Id.
Gosch, 157 Idaho at 808 (footnote omitted). Applying its “readily mobile” test, the Gosch Court
determined that the car in question—the sedan parked the driveway—was readily mobile
because “there were no indicia that the sedan was immobile.” Id. at 809.
Contrary to the State’s argument on appeal, the car at issue here is distinguishable from
the cars in Gosch, Hepperle, and Hatley. There was a clear indicator of immobility in this case:
there were no keys with the car. The absence of car keys is a factual finding, which the State
does not challenge on appeal. (Respt. Br., p.6.) The district court found, “The most persuasive
evidence here is that Penkunis had the keys to the vehicle and [Ms.] Morton was therefore unable
to drive it.” (R., p.239.) The district court had substantial and competent evidence for this
finding. Officer Mongan testified that the keys were not in the ignition or with Ms. Morton.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.16–19; see also Tr., p.47, Ls.1–3.) He also testified that he did not find the keys
during his warrantless search of the car. (Tr., p.32, Ls.16–21.) Further, Detective Hildebrandt
testified that Mr. Penkunis told him that he took the keys from Ms. Morton.3 (Tr., p.82, Ls.15–

3

By finding that Mr. Penkunis had the keys, the district court implicitly found Mr. Penkunis’s
testimony that he did not have the keys not to be credible. (Tr., p.9, Ls.19–21.)
9

24; see also State’s Ex. 5, 5:09–5:25 (Mr. Penkunis’s statement to Detective Hildebrandt about
taking the keys).) In light of this evidence, the district court properly found that Mr. Penkunis,
not Ms. Morton, had the keys. As such, the absence of car keys provided objective indicia of
immobility. The car simply did not have “the capacity to be ‘quickly moved.’” Carney, 471 U.S.
at 390 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153). Therefore, unlike in Gosch, where the officers
searched a car parked in a driveway (without any information regarding the keys to the vehicle),
the objective facts here indicated that the vehicle was not readily mobile. The district court
correctly ruled that Ms. Morton’s inability to drive the car and Mr. Penkunis’s possession of the
keys “made the vehicle not readily mobile and, therefore, not subject to the automobile
exception.” (R., p.239.) Because the State did not meet its burden to prove the automobile
exception justified the warrantless search of the backpacks, Mr. Penkunis’s Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. Accordingly, the district court properly suppressed the evidence obtained
from the subsequent search of the safe and lockbox inside the “Molle” backpack.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Penkunis respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
granting his motion to suppress.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2018.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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